EUTH. I would hope so, Socrates, but I fear lest the opposite may happen. He seems to me to have started by injuring the City at its very hearth in undertaking to wrong you. But tell me, what does he say you do to corrupt the youth?
SOC. It sounds a bit strange at first hearing, my friend. He says I am a maker of gods, and because I make new ones and do not worship the old ones, he indicted me on their accounts, he says.
EUTH. I see, Socrates. It is because you say the divine sign comes to you from time to time. So he indicts you for making innovations in religious matters and hales you into court to slander you, knowing full well how easily such things are misrepresented to the multitude. Why I, even me, when I speak about religious matters in the Assembly and foretell the future, why, they laugh at me as though I were mad. And yet nothing I ever predicted has failed to come true. Still, they are jealous of people like us. We must not worry about them, but face them boldly.
SOC. My dear Euthyphro, being laughed at is perhaps a thing of little moment. The Athenians, it seems to me, do not much mind if they think a man is clever as long as they do not suspect him of teaching his cleverness to others. But if they think he makes others like himself they become angry, whether out of jealousy as you suggest, or for some other reason.
EUTH. On that point I am not very anxious to test their attitude toward me.
SOC. Perhaps they think you give yourself sparingly, that you are unwilling to teach your wisdom. But I fear my own generosity is such that they think I am willing to pour myself out in speech to any man--not only without pay, but glad to pay myself if only someone will listen. So as I just said, if they laugh at me as you say they do at you, it would not be unpleasant to pass the time in court laughing and joking. But if they are in earnest, how it will then turn out is unclear--except to you prophets.
EUTH. Perhaps it will not amount to much, Socrates: Perhaps you will settle your case satisfactorily, as I think I will mine.
SOC. What about that, Euthyphro? Are you plaintiff or defendant?
EUTH. Plaintiff.
SOC. Against whom?
EUTH. Someone I am again thought mad to prosecute.
SOC. Really? Has he taken flight?
EUTH. He is far from flying. As a matter of fact, he is well along in years.
SOC. Who is he?
EUTH. My father.
SOC. Your father, dear friend?
EUTH. Yes, indeed.
SOC. But what is the charge? What is the reason for the suit?
EUTH. Murder, Socrates.
SOC. Heracles! Surely, Euthyphro, the majority of people must be ignorant of what is right. Not just anyone would undertake a thing like that. It must require someone quite far gone in wisdom.
EUTH. Very far indeed, Socrates.
SOC. Was the man your father killed a relative? But, of course, he must have beenyou would not be prosecuting him for murder in behalf of a stranger.
EUTH. It is laughable, Socrates, your thinking it makes a difference whether or not the man was a relative, and not this, and this alone: whether his slayer was justified. If so, let him off. If not prosecute him, even if he shares your hearth and table. For if you knowingly associate with a man like that and do not cleanse both yourself and him by bringing action at law, the pollution is equal for you both. Now as a matter of fact, the dead man was a day-laborer of mine, and when we were farming in Naxos he worked for us for hire. Well, he got drunk and flew into a rage with one of our slaves and cut his throat. So my father bound him hand and foot, threw him in a ditch, and sent a man here to Athens to consult the religious adviser as to what should be done. In the meantime, my father paid no attention to the man he had bound; he neglected him because he was a murderer and it made no difference if he died. Which is just what he did. Before the messenger got back he died of hunger and cold and his bonds. But even so, my father and the rest of my relatives are angry at me for prosecuting my father for murder in behalf of a murderer. He did not kill him, they claim, and even if he did, still, the fellow was a murderer, and it is wrong to be concerned in behalf of a man like that--and anyway, it is unholy for a son to prosecute his father for murder. They little know, Socrates, how things stand in religious matters regarding the holy and the unholy.
SOC. But in the name of Zeus, Euthyphro, do you think you yourself know so accurately how matters stand respecting divine law, and things holy and unholy, that with the facts as you declare you can prosecute your own father without fear that it is you, on the contrary, who are doing an unholy thing?
EUTH. I would not be much use, Socrates, nor would Euthyphro differ in any way from the majority of men, if I did not know all such things as this with strict accuracy.
SOC. Well then, my gifted friend, I had best become your pupil. Before the action with Meletus begins I will challenge him on these very grounds. I will say that even in former times I was much concerned to learn about religious matters, but that now, in view of his claiming that I am guilty of loose speech and innovation in these things, I have become your pupil. "And if, Meletus," I shall say, "if you agree that Euthyphro is wise in such things, then assume that I worship correctly and drop the case. But if you do not agree, then obtain permission to indict my teacher here in my place for corrupting the old--me and his own father--by teaching me, and by chastising and punishing him." And if I cannot persuade him to drop charges or to indict you in place of me, may I not then say the same thing in court that I said in my challenge?
EUTH. By Zeus, if he tried to indict me, I would find his weak spot, I think, and the discussion in court would concern him long before it concerned me.
II. Socrates requests a definition of the holy. EUTH. Why, people never stop arguing things like that, especially in the law courts. They do a host of wrongs and then say and do everything to get off.
SOC. Yes, but do they admit the wrong, Euthyphro, and admitting it, nevertheless claim they should not answer for it?
EUTH. No, they certainly do not do that.
SOC. Then they do not do and say everything: for they do not, I think, dare to contend or debate the point that if they in fact did wrong they should not answer for it. Rather, I think, they deny they did wrong. Well?
EUTH. True.
SOC. So they do not contend that those who do wrong should not answer for it, but rather, perhaps, about who it is that did the wrong, and what he did, and when.
SOC. Now is it not also the same with the gods, if as your account has it, they quarrel about what is just and unjust, and some claim that others do wrong and some deny it? Presumably no one, god or man, would dare to claim that he who does a wrong should not answer for it.
EUTH. Yes, on the whole what you say is true, Socrates.
SOC. But I imagine that those who disagree--both men and gods, if indeed the gods do disagree--disagree about particular things which have been done. They differ over given actions, some claiming they were done justly and others unjustly. True?
EUTH. Certainly.
SOC. Come now, my friend, teach me and make me wiser. Where is your proof that all gods believe that a man has been unjustly killed who was hired as a laborer, became a murderer, was bound by the master of the dead slave, and died of his bonds before the man who bound him could learn from the religious advisers what to do? Where is your proof that it is right for a son to indict and prosecute his father for murder on behalf of a man like that? Come, try to show me clearly that all the gods genuinely believe this action right. if you succeed, I shall praise you for your wisdom and never stop.
EUTH. Well, I can certainly do it, Socrates, but it is perhaps not a small task.
SOC. I see. You think I am harder to teach than the judges, for you will certainly make it clear to them that actions such as your father's are wrong, and that all the gods hate them. SOC. Then I will try to put it more clearly. We speak of carrying and being carried, of leading and being led, of seeing and being seen. And you understand in such cases, do you not, that they differ from each other, and how they differ?
EUTH. I think I do.
SOC. Now, is there such a thing as being loved, and is it different from loving?
EUTH. Of course.
SOC. Then tell me: if a thing is being carried, is it being carried in consequence of the carrying, or for some other reason?
EUTH. No, for that reason.
SOC. And if a thing is being led, it is being led in consequence of the leading? And if being seen, being seen in consequence of the seeing?
SOC. Then it is not because a thing is being seen that the seeing exists; on the contrary, it is in consequence of the seeing that it is being seen. Nor is it because a thing is being led that the leading exists; it is in consequence of the leading that it is being led. Nor is it because a thing is being carried that the carrying exists; it is in consequence of the carrying that it is being carried. Is what I mean quite clear, Euthyphro? I mean this: if something comes to be or something is affected, it is not because it is a thing which is coming to be that the process of coming to be exists, but rather, in consequence of the process of coming to be it is a thing which is coming to be; and it is not because it is affected that the affecting exits, but in consequence of the affecting, the thing is affected. Do you agree?
EUTH. Yes.
SOC. Now, what is being loved is either a thing coming to be something or a something affected by something.
SOC. And so it is as true here as it was before: it is not because a thing is being loved that there is loving by those who love it; it is in consequence of the loving that is being loved. Since you seem to be lazy and soft, I will come to your aid and help you teach me about the holy. Don't give up; consider whether you do not think that all the holy is necessarily just.
EUTH. I do.
VII. On requirements for definitions
SOC. Then is all the just holy? Or is all the holy just, but not all the just holy--part of it holy, part something else?
EUTH. I don't follow you, Socrates.
SOC. And yet you are as much wiser than I am as you are younger. As I said, you are lazy and soft because of you wealth of wisdom. My friend, extend yourself: what I mean is not hard to understand. I mean exactly the opposite of what the poet meant when he said that he was "unwilling to insult Zeus, the Creator, who made all things; for where there is fear there is also reverence." I disagree with him. Shall I tell you why?
EUTH. Yes, certainly.
SOC. I do not think that "where there is fear there is also reverence." I think people fear disease and poverty and other such things--fear them, but have no reverence for what they fear. Do you agree?
SOC. Where there is reverence, however, there is also fear. For if anyone stands in reverence and awe of something, does he not at the same time fear and dread the imputation of wickedness?
EUTH. Yes, he does.
SOC. Then it is not true that "where there is fear there is also reverence," but rather where there is reverence there is also fear, even though reverence is not everywhere that fear is: fear is broader that reverence. Reverence is part of fear just as odd is part of number, so that it is not true that where there is number there is odd, but where there is odd there is number. Surely you follow me now?
EUTH. Yes, I do.
SOC. Well then, that is the sort of thing I had in mind when I asked if, where there is just, there is also holy. Or is it rather that where there is holy there is also just, but holy is not everywhere just is, since the holy is part of the just. Shall we say that, or do you think differently?
EUTH. No, I think you are right.
SOC. Then consider the next point. If the holy is part of the just, it would seem that we must find out what part of the just the holy is. Now, to take an example we used a moment ago, if you were to ask what part of number the even is, and what kind of number it is, I would say there it is number with equal rather than unequal sides (i.e. divisible by two). Do you agree?
EUTH. Yes, I do. VIII. Third definition: the holy is ministry to the gods EUTH. Well, Socrates, I think that part of the just which is pious and holy is about ministering to the gods, and the remaining part of the just is about ministering to men.
SOC. 
